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Introduction
Since the beginning of the year 2010, more and more voices proclaim that the Sub-Prime banking crisis has entered its last stage of infection. After hitting the U.S. real estate markets, the banking sector, and the stock exchange markets all over the world, it is affecting for a while the real sector (unemployment, in particular), before hopefully disappearing. As a virus, it might then be frozen for a while, before stemming back again. But as economic systems learned from this event, they will be stronger and hopefully immune from this new virus. Nevertheless, some concerns remain about the possible mutation and resurgence of the crisis in another type of turmoil. For example, in November 30, 2009 in the Korean Times, Kenneth Rogoff wrote that "Essentially, there is still a risk that the financial crisis is simply hibernating as it slowly morphs into a government debt crisis". It is also important to notice this potential fear is not simply limited to emerging economies, such as Dubai or Ukraine, or third world countries but also concerns industrialized countries as well. In particular, the threat of a sovereign debt crisis is present for Euro area members, such as Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. This regional dispersion constitutes a specificity of the current crisis, 3 as episodes in which a European country was in default are historically extremely rare (for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) only list 13 of these periods in Spain since 1476, and 8 in France since 943!!).
Moreover, the adoption of a single currency and the various agreements related to it, such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), should have avoided the occurrence of such debt default episodes.
Recent literature has widely examined the potential linkages between a currency and a banking crisis, to assess the likelihood of a twin crisis. Typically, a sharp collapse on exchange rate markets endangers financial investments and may lead to liquidity problems, and even bankruptcy of financial institutions.
Similarly, the consequences of fiscal imbalances for currency/banking crises has been largely investigated. The seminal model of Flood and Garber (1984) , pro-vides a theoretical explanation for the occurrence of a currency crisis stemming from incoherent macroeconomic policies, and in particular an uncontrolled monetary expansion, which can be easily extended for monetized excessive public deficits (see inter alii, Corsetti and Mackowiak, 2006) . On the contrary, only few papers have scrutinized the potential mutation of banking crises into sovereign debt ones. Three types of linkages can be established. In a first instance, in reaction to a banking crisis, governments set up safety plans leading to an increase in public deficits. Financial institutions can also be supported by off-balance sheet operations such as government guarantees to commercial banks. The fiscal cost of the latter measure is difficult to evaluate as there is no direct liquidity support, but the risk associated with the potential exercise of the guarantee leads investors to ask a higher risk premium from the country or institution providing the insurance. Finally, the real consequences associated with the banking crisis (higher unemployment,...) affect government tax revenues, which will shrink, and government spending, which will rise, through social security (unemployment benefits,..) and through measures designed to stimulate global demand. This automatic stabilizer mechanism deepens the budget deficit and increases the debt, calling for even more procyclical discretionary fiscal policies.
This mechanism is particularly important for members of the European Monetary Union that committed themselves to limiting their fiscal deficits and debt in the SGP. As a consequence, this restrictive fiscal policy could increase the probability of default for households, increasing the amount on non-performing loans, again putting tensions on the banks' balance sheet.
Empirically, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a,b) even portrayed this lack of empirical studies relating banking and debt crises as 'a forgotten story', and proposed a historical analysis beginning in 1900 for a large set of developed and industrialized countries. They report for each year the proportion of banking and debt crisis episodes. It turns out that financial sector turbulences had consequences for sovereign default crisis, increasing the likelihood of the Sub-Prime crisis to mute into sovereign debt problems.
The main reason for the relative lack of empirical studies lies in the difficulty 3 to diagnose the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis. The strict definition stating that a country is facing a debt crisis, when it cannot pay for the interest or the principal of its foreign debt, is much too restrictive and would leave us with the impression that none of the European countries are facing a crisis at the moment. Similarly, providing a debt threshold beyond which a sovereign debt crisis is detected is also not operational in practice, as it would have to be country specific. For example, as Euro area countries have a stable currency and are likely to assist each other in case of difficulty in paying debt services, the threshold beyond which a Euro area country experiences a sovereign debt crisis would be higher than for a non-member country. For example, Italy and Greece were experiencing public debt exceeding 100% of the gross domestic product (gdp) without being in a formal crisis situation. For the detection of a sovereign debt crisis, one could also rely on agency ratings (Moodys or Standard and Poors), or on the spread between government bond interest rate of a country and that of a virtuous one (usually Germany or the U.S.) as this spread provides a direct indication of the refinancing costs for a government on a market. A country, with a higher risk of default, faces a higher refinancing cost of public deficits. In fact, these three measures are indicators of the debt vulnerability of the country.
The paper intends to shed some light on the potential linkages between banking and sovereign crises. It is intended to provide a better understanding of the potential mutation of the Sub-Prime turmoil into a sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. Section 2 is devoted to the definition of a sovereign debt crisis.
In Section 3, a balance sheet approach is used to explain the linkages between banking and debt crises. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis of the current situation for Euro area countries. Section 5 concludes.
Definitions
The relative scarcity of studies relating banking to debt crises is mainly due to the problems of providing operational definitions of these events, and in particular the timing and duration of debt crisis. bonds to cover its liquidity demand. Nevertheless, a country with a high risk of default should expect to reward investors with a consequent risk premium, leading to higher refinancing costs. Again, the similarity with a household is obvious: if you ask for a loan and show the bank that you have enough financial capacities to pay it back, the cost of the loan will be low. The refinancing rate is a good proxy of the investors feeling for the sustainability of a country's sovereign debt, especially for countries having the same currency. It turns out that sovereign ratings are constant over the period for half of the countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K.). 10 Only Portugal has been downgraded to a higher risk group. For this reason, this measure will not be used in the rest of the paper. Debt-gdp ratios show a lower inertia, and exhibit a negative trend before the Sub-Prime crisis. The concordance with Flood and Garber (1984) is done with the government sector balance, which includes the one of the central bank. Any shock to a specific balance sheet will have an effect on the other ones. As an example, the negative shock on the U.S. real estate price that has affected the non-financial balance sheet sector has been transmitted to the financial sector balance sheet (e.g. insolvency of households leads to losses for banks), and to the government one (e.g. reduction of tax income resulting from firm and household insolvency).
Similarly a bank panic will hit the financial sector balance sheet first, but also the government's one via a decrease in the demand for government bonds. The (direct or indirect) impact of the shock will be more important the weaker the balance sheet is, i.e. the bigger the mismatch is. Rosenberg et al. (2005) find 3 types of mismatches: the currency mismatch (a higher amount of assets labeled in foreign currency creates a vulnerability to exchange rate shocks 12 ), maturity mismatch (when long-run assets are excessive vis a vis of short run ones, the balance sheet is vulnerable to an increase in interest rates, as it increases the rolling over short-run liabilities) and market risks (a decrease in the price of an asset to which the balance sheet is over-exposed).
Using this BSA framework, it is thus possible to detect potential sources at the origin of the Sub-Prime banking crisis as the market risk (too high exposure of the financial sector balance sheet to real estate sector), and a maturity mismatch (too high proportion of long term loans, mortgage in particularly, in the liability part of the financial sector balance sheet), which lead to a bank panic.
Similarly, BSA suggests one potential weakness fostering the transmission of the banking to a sovereign debt crisis consecutive to the contraction of the asset part of the financial sector balance sheet. It leads to a lower demand for public bonds, forcing government to enter massively the foreign bond markets, deteriorating thereby their external debt position. For a member of the Euro area countries, a deterioration of the debt position would lead to pay a default risk premium.
Empirical evidence
Several papers evaluate the potential transmission of a banking crisis into a currency one (Glick and Hutchinson, 2000 for example 13 ). 12 The adoption of a single currency in the Euro area should limit this type of risk. 13 They study the joint occurrence of banking and currency crises using the probit approach on a set of annual data of 90 developed and developing economies over 20 years from 1975 to 1997. They first estimate two probit equations, one for each type of crisis, and test empirically the causal link between crises by means of a contemporaneous and a lagged dummy variable. After controlling for the influence of a set of macro variables, they find a significant contemporaneous effect of currency crises in the banking distress equation, and significant contemporaneous and lagged effects of banking crises in the currency pressure equation in the Interestingly, the linkages between banking and sovereign crises have been less investigated. However, several papers stress the ever growing real cost of banking crises. Bordo et al. (2001) found that the occurrence of a banking crisis increased since 1973 and their frequency is the same for emerging as developed countries.
14 They also showed that the real costs of banking crises have been increasing since the end of the 1970's and exceed those induced by a currency crisis. Indeed, it is likely that higher real costs will foster the mutation of the banking crisis into a sovereign debt one. Using an elaborated econometric model According to their estimates the stock of debt on average almost doubles (exactly multiplies by 1.86) three years after the banking crisis. Of course, the debt effect depends on the country considered and on several factors such as its emerging economies sub-sample. 14 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) detected one banking crisis for EMU countries since 1945, but two in Spain and Germany. In the same period the United Kingdom experienced 4 of them. 15 In the cases of currency crises they find that it follows a recession of one year, resulting in a decrease in output of 1.3%). 16 This matches the BSA links: in case of a banking crisis, financial sector demand less government bonds leading the government to ask for more liquidity on the external sector. Table   1 , 17 the amount spent on these safety plans by European countries belonging to the G20 were important, especially with respect to the guarantees, which do not appear in the government's balance sheet, but will be a risk factor in case they will be exercised. U.K. is the country, which provided the highest direct support to the financial sector (mainly via nationalization) in percent of gdp whereas the Netherlands offered the highest amounts of guarantees. Governments used the sovereign bond markets to support these plans and to finance the recessionary real effects implied by the banking crisis. As a result, sovereign debt (measured by the debt-gdp ratio) jumped from 62 percent of World GDP in 2007 to 85% in 2009 and according to the IMF projections it is expected to rise to 118% for G20 countries in 2014. Similarly, the average fiscal deficit in the G20 jumped from 1 to 7.9% in the same period of time.
The consequences of the Sub-Prime crisis of the debt vulnerability for Euro-pean countries can be directly observed via the evolution of the debt-gdp ratio.
Data are extracted from the AMECO database of the European Commission.
These yearly data are available until 2010. Notice that the 2010 data is not observed, but forecasted in the legal framework established by the Stability and Growth Pact. Table 2 gathers the debt-gdp ratio as well as its yearly growth rate for the period 2007 − 2010. Data corresponds to the general government consolidated gross debt, reported in the framework of the excessive deficit procedure (based on ESA 1995) (UDGG). Observations for 2010 are European Commission forecasts and revisions are possible two years after the first publication.
In 2009, the stock of debt exceeded 100% for Italy and Greece, and is in all cases larger than the 60% threshold imposed by the SGP. Similarly, the debt-gdp ratio increased for almost all countries, except Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. The debt growth rate is thus positive in all Euro area since 2008.
The highest variation is observed for the period 2008 − 2009. Nevertheless, it seems that a peak has been reached in 2009 as debt growth rates are expected to decrease from 2010 onward. We also remark a negative relationship between the level and the debt growth rate, indicating that countries with an important stock of debt experienced a lower increase in their debt-gdp ratio.
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The expected consequence of the deterioration of the public debt is that investors are requiring higher risk premiums. The government bond spread should thus exhibit a similar pattern as the debt. Figure 4 represents its monthly path since January 2008. Again the spread is calculated as the deviation from the German 10 year government bond interest rate. On the contrary, a positive relationship can be detected between stock market losses and debt-gdp ratio (or government bond spread): countries facing the highest stock markets losses, are also the ones experiencing the highest debt-gdp ratio and the highest risk premium. It is possible to explain theoretically this linkage 21 with a wealth effect (a decrease in stock market index leads to a negative wealth shock, having a negative impact on demand, implying a decrease in fiscal income and thus a degradation of the debt stock relative to the gdp)
amplified by a decrease in output. 
Remaining threats
This graphical empirical analysis leaves us with the feeling that the increase in debt vulnerability observed in European countries is more driven by stock market losses than government interventions aimed at rescuing the banking sector.
20 A similar conclusion can be reached when considering the growth rate of debt instead of its level.
21 Formal tests should be implemented to assess the direction of the causality. Nevertheless, potential threats are still present:
First, some countries, Greece in particular, to a lesser extent Ireland, are still problematic. With respect to Greece, the debt-gdp ratio is far above 100%
and is expected to increase by 10% in 2010. Concerning Ireland, debt is much lower (around 65%) but its growth rate is the highest in the Euro area (50% this year and still 25% for 2010). As a consequence government spread for these two countries is increasing again vis a vis of all other Euro area members. The threat lies in the potential default of one of these countries. In such a case, it would be likely 22 to observe a spill-over of the crisis to all Euro area countries. Wether or not such a crisis occurs in the coming months, these debates should tend to create a revival of studies on the relation between banking and sovereign debt crises. The story is no more forgotten and it is certain that during the next financial turmoils, particular attention will be paid to the public accounts. The fear of a potential sovereign debt crisis in Euro area, will also force European authorities to update the legal framework to address such events, considering that they are, after all, not so rare.
We can hope that this lesson will strengthen Euro area countries when facing future crises.
